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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 The Utah 
Legislature has provided that the Utah Supreme Court may transfer "to the Court of 
Appeals any case over which the Utah Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction."2 Thus, even though the Court of Appeals does not have original 
jurisdiction over this appeal,3 since the Utah Supreme Court has declined to take 
jurisdiction of the same, the Court of Appeals now has proper jurisdiction of this 
appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Summary judgment decisions present only questions of law.4 An appellate 
court should "determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing 
law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, §5. 
2
 U.C.A. § 78-2-3(4). 
3
 U.C.A. § 78-2a-3. 
4
 "A challenge to summary judgment presents only questions of law." West v. 
Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). 
l 
material fact."5 In this case, the facts were derived from stipulated facts and an 
uncontested affidavit. 
Hodsen and Anderson's claims before this and the trial court can be 
summarized in two issues: 
1. Does UMPA's prohibition on the truthful and non-misleading speech 
between Hodsen and Anderson infringe on their fundamental rights of personal, 
religious, and commercial speech, formulation of religious belief, and exercise of 
religiously motivated conduct? 
2. Has DOPL justified their infringement on the fundamental rights of Hodsen 
and Anderson by a compelling governmental interest and use of the least restrictive 
means possible to achieve that interest? 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Hodsen and Anderson rely on the following provisions of the Utah Constitution 
to vindicate their rights of speech, religion, and self-determination: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right.. .to worship according 
to the dictates of their conscience; . . . to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Utah Const., Article I § 1 . 
5
 Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149,151 (Utah 1989). 
2 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof;.... 
Utah Const., Article I § 4. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law. 
Utah Const., Article I § 7. 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or 
of the press. 
Utah Const, Article I § 15 
Hodsen and Anderson rely on the following provisions of the United States 
Constitution to vindicate their rights of speech, religion, and self-determination: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.... 
U.S. Const., First Amendment. 
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any persons within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment. 
The state statute used to justify deprivation of the constitutional rights of 
Hodsen and Anderson is the Utah Medical Practices Act (hereinafter referred to as 
the "UMPA"). The portions of UMPA that are relevant to this appeal are as follows: 
(4) "Diagnose" means: 
(a) to examine in any manner another person, parts of a person's body, 
substances, fluids, or materials excreted, taken, or removed from a 
person's body, or produced by a person's body, to determine the 
source, nature, kind, or extent of disease or other physical or mental 
condition;... 
(d) to make an examination or determination as described in 
Subsection 4(a) upon or from information supplied directly or indirectly 
by another person, whether or not in the presence of the person or 
attempting to make the diagnosis or examination. 
U.C.A. §58-67-102(4). 
Practice of medicine" means: 
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, or prescribe for any human disease, 
ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical or 
mental, real or imaginary, or to attempt to do so, by any means or 
instrumentality, and by an individual in Utah or outside the state upon 
or for any human within the state;... 
(d) to use, in the conduct of any occupation pertaining to the diagnosis 
or treatment of human diseases or conditions in any printed material, 
stationary, letterhead, envelopes, signs, or advertisements, the 
designation "doctor," "doctor of medicine," "physician," "surgeon," 
"physician and surgeon," "Dr.," M.D.," or any combination of these 
designations in any manner which might cause a reasonable person to 
believe the individual using the designation is a licensed physician and 
surgeon, and if the party using the designation is not a licensed 
physician and surgeon, the designation must additionally contain the 
description of the branch of the healing for which the person has a 
license. 
U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8)(a) and (d). 
4 
In addition to the exemptions of licensure in Section 58-1-307, the 
following individuals may engage in the described acts or practices 
without being licensed under this chapter:... 
(3)(a)(i) a person engaged in the sale of vitamins, health foods, dietary 
supplements, herbs, or other products of nature, the sale of which is not 
otherwise prohibited by state or federal law; and 
(ii) a person acting in good faith for religious reasons, as 
matter a matter of conscience, or based on a personal belief, when 
obtaining or providing any information regarding health care and the 
use of any product under Subsection 3(a)(i); and 
(b) Subsection 3(a) does not: 
(i) allow a person to diagnose any human disease, ailment, 
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition; or 
(ii) prohibit providing truthful and non-misleading information 
regarding any and all of the products under Subsection (3)(a)(i); 
(4) a person engaged in good faith in the practice of the religious 
tenets of any church or religious belief, without the use of prescription 
drugs; 
U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3) and (4). 
There are no administrative rules interpreting these statutes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case was brought as a civil rights action challenging the application of 
1996 amendments to the Utah Medical Practices Act ("UMPA") to Hodsen and 
Anderson. Declaratory judgment and injunctive relief was sought to ensure that the 
5 
exchange of truthful and non-misleading information regarding herbs and other lawful 
products between Hodsen and Anderson would not continue to be prohibited. 
B. Proceedings 
The complaint was filed on February 9, 1996. (Record at 3, (hereinafter 
referred to as "R".)) 
A third amended complaint was filed on July 8,1996. (R. at 47.) 
DOPL's answer was filed on January 6,1998. (R. at 251). 
Stipulated facts were filed on May 6,1998. (R. at 272) 
The Affidavit of Anderson was filed on May 12, 1998. (R. at 329). 
DOPL filed for summary judgment on May 12,1998. (R. at 333). 
Hodsen and Anderson filed for summary judgment on May 6, 1998. (R. at 
285.) 
Oral argument was held on May 13,1998. (R. at May 13,1998.) 
C. Disposition of the Case 
The trial court granted DOPL's summary judgment on June 30, 1998. (R. at 
373.) 
Hodsen and Anderson served a Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P. motion to alter or amend 
the Judgment on July 10,1998; the original pleading was filed with the court on July 
14, 1998. (R. at 375.) 
6 
The Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P. motion was denied on July 30,1998. (R. at 404.) 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on August 27,1998. (R. at 418). 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Relevant stipulated facts agreed to by the parties in the trial court are as 
follows: 
Hodsen has a M.D. degree from University of California at Los Angeles and 
a biochemistry degree from University of California at Berkeley. (R. at 273.) Since 
the early 1980's, he has studied and engaged in research regarding various 
biochemicals and their natural occurrence in herbal or nutritional (non-prescription) 
supplements lawfully sold on the open market. (R. at 273.) Hodsen distributes these 
products to chiropractors, physicians, other health professionals, health food stores, 
and individuals. (R. at 273.) In 1983, DOPL staff determined that the activities of 
Hodsen did not constitute the practice of medicine. (R. at 273.) 
In various administrative hearings held from 1992 to 1993, DOPL determined 
that Hodsen's use of information provided by a purchaser of herbs and other natural 
products to determine what Hodsen recommended be purchased constituted the 
practice of medicine. (R. at 275.) Hodsen appealed that decision to the Fifth 
Judicial District Court. (R. at 275.) In March of 1995, Judge Eves determined that 
Hodsen was statutorily exempt from UMPA. (R. at 276.) 
7 
Anderson consulted with Hodsen during the time period that DOPL staff had 
determined he was exempt from licensure requirements. Anderson had a health 
condition which had not responded to conventional medical treatment that had been 
applied. She followed the recommendation of Hodsen. Her condition has become 
manageable and the quality of her life vastly improved. (R. at 274.) While Anderson 
is and has been under the care of a licensed physician and acupuncturist, she also 
seeks additional truthful and non-misleading information from Hodsen regarding 
herbs and other non-prescription products of nature. (R. at 274.) 
In 1996, the Utah Legislature amended the UMPA and revised the exemption 
Judge Eves had relied upon in 1995 to find Hodsen exempt from medical licensure. 
The Legislature provided that 
[i]n addition to the exemptions from licensure in Section 58-1-307, the 
following individuals may engage in the described acts or practices 
without being licensed under this chapter:.... 
(3)(a)(i) a person engaged in the sale of vitamins, health foods, 
dietary supplements, herbs, or other products of nature, the sale of 
which is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law; or 
(ii) a person acting in good faith for religious 
reasons, as a matter of conscience, or based on a 
personal belief, when obtaining or providing any 
information regarding health care and the use of any 
product under Subsection 3(a)(i); and 
(b) Subsection 3(a) does not: 
8 
(i) allow a person to diagnose any human disease, 
ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition; or 
(ii) prohibit providing truthful and non-misleading 
information regarding any of the products under 
Subsection 3(a)(i);6 
On the face, the exemption under Subsection 3(a)(i) as clarified by Subsection 
3(b)(ii) would exempt Hodsen's commercial sharing of truthful and non-misleading 
sharing of information about herbs and other products of nature. The exemption 
allowed under Subsection 3(a)(ii) would also seem to protect both Anderson's and 
Hodsen's good faith desire "to give and receive information for religious reasons, as 
a matter of conscience, or based on a personal belief, when obtaining or providing 
any information regarding health care and the use of any" herbs or other product of 
nature. 
However, the process by which relevant information is exchanged between 
Hodsen and Anderson makes them ineligible to receive the benefit of exemptions 
that on their face seem to apply directly to their situation. Subsection 3(b) indicates 
that any person who is otherwise exempt from licensure under Subsection 3(a) may 
not "diagnose any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other 
condition."7 "Diagnosis" occurs when a person makes "a determination . . .of the 
6
 U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3). 
7
 U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3)(b)(i). 
9 
nature or extent of [a] physical... condition... from information supplied directly or 
indirectly from another person, whether or not in the presence of the person making 
. . . the diagnosis."8 
Anderson and Hodsen exchange truthful and non-misleading information as 
follows: 
(1) Anderson approaches Hodsen and shares with him any of the following 
information: 
(a) gives him a written diagnosis by a licensed health care 
provider indicating she has a certain health condition, or 
(b) explains that on her own she used home medical 
testing equipment or studied medical literature and has 
concluded she has a certain health condition, or 
(c) states she had an intuitive or spiritual impression, or 
is told in a religious blessing or otherwise, that she has a 
certain health condition; or 
(d) indicates orally or in writing that she had experienced 
symptoms of a health condition. 
(2) Using any or all of the information provided by Anderson, Hodsen 
identifies what he believes the nutritional needs of the person most 
likely are, and determines what lawful herbal or other products of nature 
would likely contribute to satisfying those needs;9 and 
8 U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d); (a); (d). 
9
 "Hodsen's approach to advising customers about the use of herbs or nutritional 
products is based on the use of regular prayer to guide his interpretation of scientific 
data and information provided by the customer for the purpose of making 
10 
(3) With or without disclosing his rationale for his recommendation, 
Hodsen advises Anderson or any other potential customer that she 
should purchase the identified lawful herbs or other products of nature, 
which the person is free to purchase from Hodsen, or any other person, 
or source, and may refer her to or supply her with peer reviewed 
academic or religious materials regarding the ingredients of the herbs 
or other products of nature. 
(R. at 282-83.) 
Thus, the 1996 UMPA specifically forbids Anderson to provide Hodsen with 
truthful and non-misleading information (which can come from a licensed physician) 
because it allows Hodsen to make "a determination.. .of the nature or extent of [a] 
physical . . . condition [of Anderson]. . . from information supplied directly or 
indirectly from [Anderson or ] another person, whether or not in the presence of the 
person making . . . the diagnosis."10 Simply stated, if Anderson was to provide 
Hodsen with a statement from her licensed physician that she was suffering from 
high blood pressure and Hodsen relied on the information as a beginning point when 
he was determining what herbs or other products of nature he would advise that she 
use, Hodsen would be guilty of practicing medicine because he "diagnosed" her 
condition. Because of this restriction in Subsection 3(b)(i), Anderson and Hodsen are 
recommendations. He believes that he can and does receive divine assistance 
regarding these matters. Hodsen believes his knowledge obtained through formal 
training in biochemistry and medicine also enable him to interpret the meaning of the 
information provided to him." (R. at 274.) 
10 U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d); (a); (d). 
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unable to avail themselves of those exemptions from medical licensure allowed (1) 
under Subsection 3(a)(i) for those involved in marketing herbs and other products 
of nature, and (2) under Subsection 3(a)(ii) for those desiring information regarding 
these products as a matter of conscience, religious faith, or deeply held personal 
belief. This interpretation is in accord with the earlier determination of Judge Eves 
that the pre-1996 UMPA exchange of information between Hodsen and Anderson 
constituted the practice of medicine because Hodsen was "diagnosing." (R. at 276.) 
In addition, DOPL has decided that Hodsen's desired use of the designation 
M.D. on business cards or articles for journals (with an explanation included stating 
"Graduate of UCLA School of Medicine" and "Research Biochemist not in Medical 
Practice") constitutes the unlicensed practice of medicine. (R. at 280-81.) This is so 
because DOPL fears that the use of the designation and disclaimer might cause a 
reasonable person to believe that Hodsen was a licensed physician or surgeon and, 
in connection with Hodsen's business, may be deceptive or misleading regarding 
Hodsen's status or qualifications insofar as it relates to licensure. (R. at 281.) 
DOPL's absolute prohibitions on the ability of Hodsen and Anderson (or any other 
person) to exchange information with Hodsen, and his inability to use the title "M.D.", 
as clarified above, have interfered with Hodsen's on-going business of consulting, 
selling, and working with herbs and other products of nature. (R. at 281-82.) 
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Anderson has also been damaged by DOPL's refusal to deny her a right to 
exchange truthful and non-misleading information with Hodsen. She desires to 
receive directly from Hodsen truthful and non-misleading information regarding what 
would be appropriate use of herbs and other products of nature for her. (R. at 330.) 
Anderson desires to obtain information in an effort to formulate her religious beliefs 
regarding the use of wholesome herbs and other products of nature with "prudence 
and thanksgiving" pursuant to Doctrine and Covenants 89:10-11.11 (R. at 330.) By 
obtaining and sharing information regarding the prudent use of herbs Anderson will 
more fully live her religious beliefs, entitling her to both physical and spiritual 
blessings. (R. at 330.) Anderson believes that Hodsen has received and will receive 
divine inspiration regarding her needs. (R. at 330.) Anderson cannot formulate her 
religious beliefs and exercise them without exercising her free speech right to obtain 
and share truthful and non-misleading information about her health condition from 
Hodsen. (R. at 331.) Anderson believes that the restrictions of UMPA has harmed 
her, damaged her physically and spiritually, and diminished her quality of life. (R. at 
331) 
11
 "And again, verily I say unto you, all wholesome herbs God hath ordained for 
the constitution, nature, and use of man - Every herb in the season thereof, and 
every fruit in the season thereof; all these to be used with prudence and 
thanksgiving." Doctrine & Covenants 89:10 - 1 1 . 
13 
Another religious tenent of Anderson is to obey the law. (R. at 331). Anderson 
was afraid that if she did exchange information with Hodsen, she would be soliciting 
a felony, a criminal act in and of itself. (R. at 331.) She seeks clarification of the law 
to ensure that her efforts to formulate and live her religious beliefs regarding a health 
code do not cause her to violate another religious tenent prohibiting civil 
disobdience. (R. at 331.) 
Being unsure of the status of the law and the lawful exercise of their rights, 
both Anderson and Hodsen sought injunctive and declaratory relief to ensure that the 
UMPA did not infringe on their fundamental rights of speech and religion. (R. at 281 -
82 and 331.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The total prohibition of certain speech imposed by the 1996 UMPA has 
prevented Hodsen and Anderson from exchanging truthful and non-misleading 
information so that Hodsen may give advice to Anderson regarding the use of herbs 
and other products of nature as formulates and exercises religious beliefs as well as 
makes personal health decisions in addition to those she makes with her licensed 
physician and acupuncturist. In addition, Hodsen's speech has also been infringed 
by the refusal of DOPL to allow him to use in business cards and published articles 
the designation "M.D." when such is clarified by written disclaimers stating he is 
14 
graduate of UCLA Medical School, working as a research biochemist and not in the 
practice of medicine. This complete ban on speech places DOPL's administration 
of UPMA in direct conflict with the constitutional rights of Hodsen and Anderson to 
speech, formulation and practice of religious belief. The unique religious provisions 
of Utah's Constitution and the exemptions allowed by UPMA justify giving Anderson 
protections for religious thought and speech that are greater than the norm. There 
is similarly no need to limit the protection Utah's Constitution affords to commercial 
speech. 
DOPL can not constitutionally justify this direct infringement by UMPA on 
Hodsen and Anderson's fundamental rights of speech as well as formulation and 
exercise of religious belief by either a compelling governmental interest — an 
interest of the highest order—or demonstrate it has used the least restrictive means 
in doing so. DOPL's total ban on truthful and non-misleading speech between 
healthy, educated, and competent adults regarding advice on the use of herbs and 
other lawful products of nature presumes an in loco parentis role that is normally 
limited to intervention on behalf of abused or neglected children. The express 
allowance of significant similar expression undermines any claim that the expression 
prohibited in this case is an interest of the highest order. Previous precedent limiting 
exercise of express rights under the Utah State Constitution or upholding criminal 
15 
prosecution under UMPA are distinguishable factually and as a matter of law (both 
as to constitutional issues raised and intervening precedent since the earlier rulings). 
There are no express constitutional provisions that mandate the speech and religious 
rights of Hodsen and Anderson are to be minimized by either balancing their 
congruent claims against each other or allowing DOPL to overlook the restraints in 
Utah's Declaration of Rights when it fulfills the duty of the Executive to see that 
statutes are faithfully upheld. In this case, the undisputed evidence fails to show any 
health or moral crisis that requires the abandonment of any one fundamental right 
to preserve the present or future ability of the State to protect the exercise of all 
others by Hodsen, Anderson, or the people generally. 
DOPL has also failed to use the least restrictive means of protecting Hodsen 
and Anderson from their exchange of truthful and non-misleading information. The 
1996 Legislature failed to follow its earlier framework used in the 1986 Dietician 
Certification Act when it restricted the right of individuals involved in evaluating, 
recommending, and providing services regarding herbs and other products of nature 
only when a designation of certified dietician was used by the person providing the 
advice. The 1996 Legislature also failed to consider the option used by forty-seven 
other states to not include the exchange of information and reliance thereon as part 
of their definition of diagnosis. Finally, DOPL's total ban on Hodsen's truthful use of 
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the designation "M.D." is not tempered by allowing his voluntary offer to place 
disclaimers of being in medical practice. 
Hodsen and Anderson have demonstrated by stipulated evidence, and briefed 
in the lower court and in this court, that the total ban on truthful and non-misleading 
speech arising from DOPL's application of UMPA to them has directly conflicted with 
their fundamental rights of speech as well as formulation and exercise of religious 
beliefs. Neither DOPL nor the 1996 Legislature have been able to demonstrate that 
the assumed in loco parentis protection being imposed on healthy, educated and 
rational adults satisfies a compelling interest — or interest of a highest order—and 
that their newly imposed total ban on particular speech between Hodsen and 
Anderson is the least restrictive means that can be used to meet the objective of 
protecting the public from their own choices. Thus, under the facts of this case, 
UMPA cannot be applied by DOPL to defeat the exercise by Hodsen and Anderson 
of their rights of speech as well as formulation and exercise of religious belief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Refusal to Allow Hodsen and Anderson to Exchange Truthful 
and Non-Misleading Information Infringes on 
Fundamental Rights 
Hodsen and Anderson are asking this court to protect their constitutional right 
to private or religious speech, commercial speech, formulation of religious belief, 
17 
and free exercise of religious practice. The Utah constitutional provisions relied upon 
by Hodsen and Anderson are self-executing because they 
articulate a rule sufficient to give effect to the underlying rights and 
duties intended by the framers. . . .and 'if no ancillary legislation is 
necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, of the enforcement of a 
duty imposed.'12 
Constitutional protections under the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution have been binding on the State of Utah since 1940.13 
A. Unique Provisions in the Utah's Law Afford 
Greater Protections to Anderson 
Than the Norm 
Anderson is entitled to protections under the Utah Constitution's unique 
religious provisions as well as those of the First Amendment that are afforded 
because of the text of UMPA. 
12
 Bott v. DeLand. 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). 
13
 Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 
(1940). While at times federal court rulings in the establishment area have been 
inconsistent and possibly unprincipled, see Society of Separationists v. Whitehead. 
870 P.2d 916, 931 (Utah 1993), the "strict scrutiny" constitutional analytical 
framework regarding free exercise of religion has been aapplied for the sake of 
argument in one recent case interpreting portions of the Utah Constitution. Jeffs v. 
Stubbs. 917 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). 
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1. Protection Under the Unique Provisions of the Utah Constitution 
The Utah Constitution is not "hostile, suspicious or even unfriendly" to 
religion.14 Indeed, Anderson's entitlement to constitutional protection to formulate 
religious belief are uniquely protected by the provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Two textual provisions of the Utah Constitution offer explicit protection to rights of 
conscience and religious sentiment, concepts that deal with thought, belief, and 
understanding. Even though the record in the Utah Constitutional Convention 
provides limited insight to these provisions, perhaps a "page of history"15 provided 
by the 1890 United States Supreme Court decision upholding a denial of voting 
rights and jury assignments to members of the dominant faith solely on the basis of 
religious belief,16 explains why the Utah delegates provided more immediate and 
explicit protection than their neighboring states. 
Article I § 4 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[t]he rights of conscience 
shall never be infringed." Neither any other state constitution nor the United States 
14
 Society of Separationists v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916, 939 (Utah 1993) 
(citation omitted.) 
15
 Jd. at 921 (citation omitted.) 
16See Davis v. Beason. 133 U.S. 133, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 837 (1890), 
overruled in part Roemer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620,116 S.Ct. 1620,134 L.Ed.2d 855 
(1996). 
19 
Constitution has such a provision. No court outside the State of Utah has ever cited 
this provision.17 
Article III § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]erfect toleration of 
religious sentiment is guaranteed." Like the text of the Utah Enabling Act, similar 
texts in other states only provide that "perfect toleration" will "be secured."18 The 
selection of self-executing language in the Utah Constitution not only ensured court 
application of the same,19 but also indicates a desire to guarantee a higher level of 
protection to religious thought and belief than that found or stated elsewhere. 
17
 See Jane L. v. Banaerter. 794 F. Supp. 1528 (1992), reversed on other 
grounds. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (1993); Albright v. Board of Educ. of 
Granite School Dist.. 765 F. Supp. 682 (D.C.Utah 1991); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 917 P.2d 
1234(Utah 1998); Society of Separationists v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 
1993); Society of Separationists v. Taoaart. 862 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1993); State v. 
DeMille. 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988); State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984); 
Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549 (Utah 1973); In re State ex. rel. Black. 3 
Utah 2d 315,283 P.2d 887 (Utah), cert, denied 350 U.S. 923,76 S.Ct. 211,100 L.Ed 
87 (1955); Gubler v. Utah State Teacher's Retirement Board. 192 P.2d 458 (Utah 
1948). 
18
 See Arizona Const., Art. XX H First; Oklahoma Const., Art. I § 2; North Dakota 
Const., Art. XIII, § 1, U 1; South Dakota Const., Art. XXII, U First; Wyoming Const., 
Art. 21 § 25. 
19
 The review of this language by the Utah Supreme Court appears to have 
presumed it was self-executing. See Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, supra. 
870 P.2d at 928-929, 934-934; In re State in Interest of Black, supra. 283 P.2d at 
905. 
20 
All of the foregoing demonstrates a basis for inferring an intent to provide 
maximum protection for the formulation of religious belief. Read together,20 these 
two provisions strongly support Anderson's right to obtain truthful and non-
misleading information from Hodsen that will assist her in formulating her religious 
beliefs regarding how she can use of wholesome herbs with "prudence and 
thanksgiving"21 to meet her physical and religious needs.22 (R. at 330) 
2. Protection Under the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution 
Beyond the rights stated above, Anderson's need for information to formulate 
religious belief and religious speech can receive protection under the free exercise 
of religion clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In 
addition to application of a "hybrid" claim, the First Amendment requires that "laws 
burdening religious practice must be of general applicability." M As written, the 
UMPA exemptions indicate that it is not a law of general applicability. 
20
 "When construing provisions of our constitution, we must read the document 
as a whole, giving effect to all provisions." West v. Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 
999, 1015 (Utah 1994). 
21
 Doctrine and Covenants 89:11-12. 
22
 None of Utah Supreme Court cases upholding earlier versions of the UMPA 
have reviewed these constitutional provisions in conjunction of the UMPA. 
23
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave v. City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520,113 S.Ct. 
2217, 2232,124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (citations omitted). 
21 
Further, the Free Exercise Clause "'protects religious observers against 
unequal treatment.'"24 Hodsen's speech is treated by DOPL as commercial, public 
speech. (If it was considered to be religious, he would have an exemption under § 
53A-12-30(5), U.C.A.) Hodsen's commercial speech is not exempt under the 
marketing exemption for herbs and other products of nature (§ 53A-12-30(4) U.C.A.,) 
because his providing of advice includes his reliance on a statement by Anderson 
concerning a real or imagined condition. (R. at 274 and 330). Thus, Anderson — 
who believes Hodsen is both competent in his educational training and professional 
development regarding herbs and a recipient of divine inspiration regarding the 
same — is confronted under UMPA with a "lose-lose" situation when she desires to 
exchange truthful and non-misleading information in order to formulate religious 
beliefs regarding the use of wholesome herbs "with prudence and thanksgiving."25 
(R. at 330-1) First, she may speak with those who are solely religiously motivated 
but have no medical or biochemical training regarding herbs. Second, she may 
speak with those who may be licensed in medicine (and who may also not have 
training regarding herbs or other products of nature) without confidence that they will 
seek and receive divine inspiration regarding the advice given to Anderson, (which 
24
 id- at 2232 (citations omitted). 
25
 Doctrine and Covenants 89:11. 
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advice will be used in the formulation of her religious beliefs.) (R. at 283 and 330-1) 
Thus, as applied to her, Anderson faces an inability to obtain truthful and non-
misleading information necessary to formulate her religious beliefs from a person 
who (1) has training and experience that demonstrates competence in providing it 
and (2) a demonstrated ability to seek and receive divine inspiration regarding the 
advice given. (R. at id.) 
The Utah Legislature has created this dilemma for Anderson because it 
exempted those who exchange information or advice for religious or other deeply 
held reasons when dealing with other medical and health matters except as it relates 
to herbs or other lawful products of nature. Regardless of the Utah Legislature's 
motivation, the 1996 UMPA has prohibited the speech of Anderson (and those who 
believe in religious directives regarding herbs and other products of nature) while the 
religious or deeply held beliefs of others regarding different aspects of medicine or 
health practice remain unrestricted. (R. at 280) 
Thus, because of Utah's unique UMPA provisions and exemptions, UMPA's 
application in this situation cannot satisfy the remnant of Free Exercise protection 
afforded by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
23 
B. The Rights Anderson and Hodsen Seek to Protect Are "Fundamental" 
DOPL's application of the UMPAto prohibit the exchange of truthful and non-
misleading information between Hodsen and Anderson interferes with their rights 
of speech, formulation of religious belief, and exercise of religious belief. Each of 
these rights asserted has been recognized by both the Utah and the United States 
Supreme Courts as being fundamental by reason of their specific inclusion in the text 
of the constitutions as well as modem judicial interpretation of the traditions of our 
state and nation. 
Hodsen and Anderson's freedom of personal, private, or religious speech are 
protected by express textual provisions of the constitutions of Utah and United 
States. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits 
Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of speech"; 
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah guarantees everyone the 
inherent and inalienable right "to communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right," and Section 15 
thereof provides "no law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech "26 
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that 
[fjreedom of speech is not only the hallmark of a free people, but is, 
indeed, an essential attribute of the sovereignty of citizenship. . . 
26
 West Gallery Corporation v. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners. 586 P.2d 
429, 430 (Utah 1978). 
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.Freedom of speech is. . .essential for the psychological, moral, 
intellectual, and political well-being of individuals.27 
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that because of the protections of 
the First Amendment, governments "may not unduly suppress free communication 
of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions."28 
Freedom of speech is not just giving information; it "necessarily protects the right 
to receive."29 
Hodsen also claims his right to freedom of commercial speech in his business 
and use of the designation M.D. (on his business cards and professional writing) are 
protected by the same express textual provisions of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions that apply to personal speech. Unlike the United States Constitution, 
no case law under the Utah Constitution has determined that commercial speech 
receives a different level of protection than that allowed personal speech. 
Nonetheless, even using a less stringent federal standard, Hodsen's commercial 
communication in this case should be protected. 
27
 Cox v. Hatch. 761 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1988). 
28
 Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at 308,60 S.Ct. at 905,84 L.Ed. 1213 
(1940). 
29
 Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 
(1943). 
25 
Commercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading can be 
restricted, but only if the State shows that the restriction directly and 
materially advances a substantial state interest in a manner no more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest The State's burden 
is not slight; the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough 
to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing 
the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the 
harmless from the harmful.' . . .'[MJere speculation or conjecture' will 
not suffice; rather the State 'must demonstrate that the harms it recites 
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material 
degree.'30 
In addition to the unique protections afforded the formulation of religious belief 
under the Utah Constitution, the right to engage in religiously motivated conduct is 
expressly protected under both the Utah and United States Constitutions. Without 
deciding the issue, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a form of analysis that 
assumed that the Utah Constitution provided greater protection for religious conduct 
than afforded by present interpretation of the United States Constitution by the 
United States Supreme Court.31 Nonetheless, in spite of the limited federal 
protections afforded religious objections to state laws of a general nature,32 such 
limitations do not apply when, as in this case, (1) UMPA is not a law of general 
30
 Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. 512 
U.S. 136, 142-143, 114 S.Ct. 2084, 2088-89, 129 LEd.2d 118 (1994) (citations 
omitted). 
31
 See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 917 P.2d 1234(Utah 1998) 
32
 Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res, v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 879,110 S.Ct. 
1595, 1600, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). 
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application because of its many and varied exemptions, and (2) the religious 
exercise is jointly exercised with another fundamental freedom such as speech. 
In addition, Anderson has the right of personal autonomy and self-
determination as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
No right is more sacred or more carefully guarded, by the common law, 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by 
clear and unquestionable authority of law.33 
Indeed, "every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body[.]M34 Anderson asserts the right to 
receive information regarding lawful products necessary to help them decide what 
actions they will take regarding their own health care and treatment. 
C. As Applied, DOPL's Absolute Prohibition on Speech 
Directly Conflicts with Hodsen's and Anderson's 
Exercise of Fundamental Rights 
UMPA's absolute prohibition on the exchange of truthful and non-misleading 
information between Hodsen and Anderson as well as his use, with written 
clarification, of the designation "M.D.", establish a direct conflict between the 
regulatory conduct of DOPL and the fundamental rights of Hodsen and Anderson. 
33
 Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health. 497 U.S. 261, 269,110 S.Ct. 2841, 2846, 
111 LEd.2d 224 (1990) (citations omitted). 
34
 Woodland v. Angus. 820 F. Supp. 1497,1504 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
27 
Early in Utah's jurisprudence, the application of a statute to an individual could be 
declared unconstitutional if it (1) "deprived a citizen of some right or privilege granted 
by the Constitution," (2) "violated some right of the individual," (3) was "clearly 
prohibited by some provision of the Constitution," or (4) was "unreasonable or 
discriminatory."35 More recently, the degree of the required conflict has been stated 
as "manifestly infringing] upon some constitutional provision"36 or being "clearly and 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution."37 
The stipulated facts in this case indicate that the conflicts between Hodsen 
and Anderson's exercise of fundamental rights and the absolute prohibitions 
imposed by the UMPA are real, direct and significant to each individual. Anderson 
is impeded in her desire to ask for and receive information with both an holistic and 
scientific basis which has been tempered by what she understands to be divine 
guidance. (R. at 330) Anderson believes that this fusion of informed examination, 
and sharing of knowledge with inspiration from a personal God is essential for both 
her physical and spiritual well-being. (R. at 331) Hodsen is impeded in his desire 
to not practice medicine today (R. at 273), but to carry out what he views as a "divine 
35
 Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair. 57 Ut. 516, 196 P.2d 221, 223 (1921). 
36
 Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1994). 
37
 Utah Farm Bureau Insurance v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Association. 564 P.2d 
751, 753 (Utah 1997). 
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mission to assist his fellow man in obtaining and properly using herbal and other 
products of nature". (R. at 274) 
Notwithstanding these direct conflicts, Hodsen and Anderson recognize that 
"the First Amendment does not . . . guarantee absolute freedom of speech".38 
Indeed, "[f]reedom of speech and religion are not unlimited licenses to do unlawful 
acts under the label of constitutional privilege."39 For example, "[o]ne may not with 
impunity make statements which constitute slander, or perjury, or treason."40 
However, the mere fact that there are theoretical and practical limitations to the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms does not license the state to abrogate them at its 
convenience. The state's actions must fit within the narrow confines outlined below, 
restraints which this court and the United States Supreme Court have already 
recognized as being incumbent upon constitutional governments. 
38
 Cassidv v. Salt Lake County Fire Civil Service Council. 364 Ut.Adv.R. 6 
(March 16,1999). citing Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr. 518 U.S. 668, 
116 S.Ct. 2342, 2347, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996). 
39
 State v. Musser. 110 Utah 534, 546,175 P.2d 724, 731 (1946). 
40
 Shields v. Toronto. 16 Utah 2d 61, 69, 395 P.2d 829, 835 (1964). 
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II. DOPL Has Not Constitutionally Justified Its Prohibition of Hodsen's and 
Anderson's Speech, Formulation and Exercise of Religious Belief 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that even though "statutes are presumed 
constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown,"41 "[t]he burden is on [DOPL] to 
justify such measures if they impinge on some fundamental right"42. When 
fundamental rights are infringed as noted above, DOPL must demonstrate there is 
"(1) a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and (2) that the means 
adopted are 'narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose"'43 or "the least 
restrictive means" to do so have been used.44 
These requirements are similar to that of the United States Supreme Court 
which has "required the most exacting scrutiny in which a State undertakes to 
regulate speech on the basis of its content."45 "For the State to enforce a content 
41
 Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994). 
42
 State ex. rel. Division of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 
1343, 1350 (Utah 1990). 
43
 Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah. 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984). 
44
 Jeffs v. Stubbs. 917 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). 
45
 Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263, 276, 102 S.Ct. 269, 277, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 
(1981). 
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based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
governmental interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."46 
A. DOPL Has No Compelling Governmental Interest In This Case 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously assumed that the regulatory 
framework of DOPL served compelling governmental interests. 
Title 58 indicates quite clearly that its general purpose is to provide for 
the qualification, registration and licensing of persons who hold 
themselves out to the public as having qualifications in specialized 
areas which affect the public health, safety, or welfare and thus to guard 
against unqualified persons deluding others into believing that they are 
competent to render such specialized services.47 
The Legislature is protecting the people from the quacks who would 
deceive them into thinking they are receiving medical relief, when, in 
reality, they are being deprived of their money without the remotest 
possibility of cure. This type of quackery also prevents people who 
may be or are in the dire need of competent aid by their either delaying 
or foregoing proper treatment. These ill people think they are being 
cured, when, in fact, they are receiving no real help.48 
46
 Frisby v. Schultz. 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 
(1988) (citations omitted). 
47
 Cannon v. Gardner. 611 P.2d 1207,1210 (1980) (This was in reference with 
surveryors. It is interesting to note that the interest in question was overruled in this 
case.) 
48 State v. Hoffman. (Hoffman n. 558 P.2d 602, 605-606 (Utah 1976). 
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UMPA's total ban on truthful and non-misleading discussions of Hodsen and 
Anderson can not be justified by a compelling governmental interest. This can be 
shown in at least four ways. 
1. Allowing Appreciable Damage to a Possible Rationale Indicates 
the Interest Is Not Compelling 
The de facto assumption of UPMA is that the State of Utah must act in loco 
parentis to protect a healthy, educated and rational adult population when 
exchanging truthful and non-misleading information used to formulate religious 
beliefs and health decisions regarding herbs and other products of nature. To 
constitutionally justify the same, DOPL must show that this rationale protects a 
compelling governmental interest, an interest of the highest order. 
It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that 'a law cannot 
be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order1 .. when it 
leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 
unprohibited.49 
The text and adoption of the 1996 UMPA demonstrates that the total prohibitions of 
information-exchange imposed on Hodsen and Anderson are not of the highest 
order. This can be shown in six ways. 
First, if the UMPA's total ban on the speech of Hodsen and Anderson arises 
because of the need to prevent information-exchange based "diagnosis," this interest 
49
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave v. City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520, 546,113 
S.Ct. 2217, 223,124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993)(citations omitted). 
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is substantially undermined by an exemption allowing such information to be 
exchanged in a religious setting or where motivated by deeply held personal belief 
so long as prescription drugs are not used.50 
Second, if the UMPA's total ban on the speech of Hodsen and Anderson 
arises because of the need to prevent speech about herbs and other lawful products 
of nature, this interest is substantially undermined because there is no prohibition on 
the availability of 
numerous scientific publications and other studies that indicate the use 
of herbs or products of nature, religiously based belief or prayer, and 
other aspects of holistic healing have a positive impact upon the 
maintenance of one's health.51 
Third, if the UMPA's total ban on the speech of Hodsen and Anderson arises 
because of the need to prevent advice being given advice could be given regarding 
one's diet and its possible impact on health, this interest is substantially undermined 
because the State of Utah allows persons who do not use a title claiming or implying 
they are a certified dietician to: 
integrate] and appl[y] principles derived from the sciences of food for 
the development, management and provision of dietary services for 
individuals and groups for meeting their health care needs. . . 
[including] the evaluation of a person's dietary status,. . .the advising 
U.C.A. § 58-67-305(4) 
R. at 284. 
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and education of persons on dietary needs,.. .the evaluation of needs, 
implementation of support systems to support needs... .52 
Fourth, if after Judge Eves found Hodsen was properly exempted under UMPA 
in 1995, the 1996 Legislature determined Hodsen's reliance on truthful and non-
misleading information provided to him by Anderson had suddenly created a clear 
and present danger justifying a total ban on their exchange of truthful and non-
misleading information, the removal of the word "advice" from the definition of the 
practice of medicine in the definition of "the practice of medicine" surely undermined 
such an assertion. Furthermore, in the nearly thirteen year practices of Hodsen, 
Anderson and DOPL allowing such speech surely also indicate that the interest was 
not of the highest order. (R. at 273,276,281) It is also interesting to note that there 
had never been a complaint against Hodsen in that time. (R. at 273) 
Fifth, if by happenstance, without reference to Hodsen or Anderson, the 1996 
Legislature determined that reliance on truthful and non-misleading information in 
giving advice regarding health matters created such a potential for misuse that a 
total ban on the desired speech Hodsen and Anderson was necessary, their failure 
to recognize such a need since 1969 when the first exemption regarding the sale of 
herbs and other products of nature was in place undermines their new found 
assertion of the compelling interest in 1996. It is significant that no facts 
52
 See Dietician Certification Act, § 58-49-2(4) U.C.A. 
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demonstrating a new found recognition of a need for blanket public protection from 
personal decisions made from truthful and non-misleading information were either 
included as findings in the 1996 UPMA or presented to the trial court. 
Sixth, if UMPA's total ban on the use of the "M.D." designation by Hodsen 
arises because of the need to prevent any reasonable person from believing he was 
licensed by the State of Utah, this interest is substantially undermined because the 
State of Utah allows does not restrict medical practitioners (who are not licensed to 
practice medicine in the State of Utah) from using the "M.D." a designation when 
they are (1) serving in the armed forces or other federal agency and are licensed 
elsewhere, (2) involved in a fellowship under the supervision of qualified persons, 
(3) consult with an individual licensed in this state, or (4) be an invitee of a school, 
association, or society to conduct a lecture, clinic, or demonstration of the practice 
of medicine provided they do not establish a place or business or regularly engage 
in the practice of the regulated profession in the state.53 These other individuals 
allowed to use the "M.D." designation without Utah licensure may nor may not be 
U.C A. § 58-1-307(1)(a),(b),(c),(d),(e). 
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able to comply with the requirement to list the "description of the branch of the 
healing arts for which the person has a license."54 Hodsen obviously cannot. 
In sum, these exceptions undermine the asserted compelling nature of 
UMPA's interest in prohibiting the truthful acknowledgment that one has graduated 
from medical school or that there is some significant public health threat which the 
1996 amendment of UMPA corrects. 
2. Compelling Interests Restricting Speech and 
Conduct In Other Cases Do Not Apply 
Two other situations where the Utah Supreme Court has defined compelling 
interests that justified restrictions on speech and conduct of citizens are 
distinguishable from the State's interest in this case. 
First, as it relates to commercial speech, 
[t]he state obviously has a substantial and compelling interest in 
protecting the public from false, deceptive, or misleading advertising. 
. . .and from other aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue 
influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious 
conduct.55 
54
 U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8)(d). The statute does not indicate whether the "licensed 
physician and surgeon" must be licensed by the State of Utah. 
55
 In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary Rules on 
Advertising. 647 P.2d 991, 993 (Utah 1982). 
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All of the speech that has been exchanged between Hodsen and Anderson 
regarding herbs and other products of nature is truthful and non-misleading. (R. at 
331) Thus, the factual justification necessary to create a compelling interest in the 
regulation of speech is not present in this case. 
Second, the state has been found to have a compelling governmental interest 
in "protecting its citizens from threatening or harmful behavior" of others.56 The facts 
of this case show that the only products being used are lawfully sold on the open 
market. Surely, Truthful and non-misleading speech regarding lawful products is not 
"threatening or harmful behavior." Hodsen's use of "M.D." on a business card and 
in articles — with his explanation of being an UCLA Medical school graduate, 
working as a research biochemist and not in the practice of medicine — is not, in 
and of itself, false, deceptive, or misleading. DOPL has claimed that 
such a use of the initials "M.D." might cause a reasonable person to 
believe that Hodsen is a licensed physician or surgeon and that such 
use, in connection with Hodsen's businesses, may be deceptive or 
misleading regarding Hodsen's status or qualifications as it applies to 
DOPL's regulatory function.57 
DOPL's claim that his use of M.D. "might cause a reasonable person to 
believe that Hodsen is licensed", or "may be deceptive or misleading" as to his 
State v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259,1264 (Ut.App. 1997). 
R. at 281. 
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licensed status is not constitutionally valid in this case because Hodsen does not 
prescribe like a physician or operate like surgeon. DOPL can not show a compelling 
interest in regulating Hodsen's speech because 
'mere speculation or conjecture' will not suffice; rather the State 'must 
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will 
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.'58 
No evidence has been tendered or offered at either the Legislative or trial level 
that would justify DOPL's total ban on Hodsen's use of the "M.D." designation. Thus, 
under the undisputed facts of this case, there is no basis for recognizing compelling 
governmental interests in protecting the public from false and misleading speech or 
harmful conduct of others is not present in this case. 
3. Utah Cases Limiting the Exercise of Express Rights 
Under the State Constitution Are Distinguishable 
Certain modern cases have concluded that state constitutional rights may be 
regulated despite the absolute declarations to the contrary in the Utah Constitution. 
Again, however, these cases are distinguishable both on questions of fact and law 
from the total ban on the truthful and non-misleading speech that is imposed on 
Hodsen and Anderson. 
58
 Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, supra. 
512 U.S. at 142-143, 114 S.Ct. at 2089. 
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Utah appellate courts have clarified these rationales justifying when the 
exercise specifically stated constitutional rights are limited by the exercise of state 
police power. In 1955, the Utah Supreme Court considered various claims of a 
polygamistthat he was entitled to the protections afforded by Article I Sections 1,4 
and 15 of the Utah Constitution. The Court specifically refuted the claims by using 
another equally specific prohibition against polygamy contained in Article III, § 1: 
Article III of our Constitution is a complete answer to appellants' 
contention. The specific prohibition against polygamous or plural 
marriage therein contained may not be impliedly annulled by any 
interpretation of sections 1,4 and 15 of Article I inconsistent therewith. 
The prohibition following as it does the guarantee of religious toleration 
prevents any conclusion that the framers of our Constitution did not 
intend to put a specified limitation on the language contained in Section 
4, Article I of the State Constitution.59 
In 1983, the Utah Supreme Court examined a claim of whether or not a trial 
court could issue a "short term prior restraint on publication in the interest of assuring 
a defendant has his constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury free of outside 
influences."60 While the prior restraint was not upheld because of failure to comply 
with notice and hearing,61 it was noted in dictum that even though the ability to limit 
the freedom of the press 
59
 In re State ex. rel. Black, supra, 283 P.2d at 905 (Utah). 
60
 KUTV. Inc. v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1983). 
61Ja\ at 521-5. 
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might be qualified where the countervailing interest is national survival 
or imminent loss of life . . .[f]reedom of discussion should be given the 
widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and 
orderly administration of justice.62 
Finally, in 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected an absolute challenge to the 
criminal regulation of animal fighting as violative of the Defendant's right to "own and 
possess property in violation of Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution."63 
Relying on previous 1915 Utah Supreme Court precedent regarding property, the 
appellate court held that "all the constitutional provisions . . . in whatever terms 
expressed, must nevertheless be construed and applied in connection with the police 
power of the state."64 However, these three cases are factually and legally 
distinguishable from the present case. 
First, unlike the 1955 polygamy case, there is no express constitutional 
prohibition against a desire to receive, use or share truthful and non-misleading 
information for the formulation or expression of religious belief. To the contrary, the 
only express protections which exist support Hodsen and Anderson.65 
id. at 528. (Citations omitted). 
West Valley City v. Streeter. 849 P.2d 613, 617-618 (Ut.App. 1993). 
Id. at 618. citing State v. Briqqs. 46 Utah 288,146 P. 261, 262 (1915). 
Utah Const. Article I § 4; Article III § 1. 
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Second, in the 1983 case regarding prior restraint, the conflict arose between 
the exercise of rights expressly guaranteed by the Utah Constitution to the press and 
criminally accused.66 There are no express constitutional provisions in the Utah 
Constitution that posit a potential clash between fundamental rights of Hodsen and 
Anderson who are making congruent constitutional claims. Furthermore, DOPL's 
constitutional claim under UMPA is limited to the Executive's duty to see "that the 
laws are faithfully executed."67 Since this duty includes the "mandatory and 
prohibitory"68 provisions protecting individuals against government interference with 
rights specifically enumerated in the Utah Constitution's Declaration of Rights, 
DOPL's statutory application of UPMA to Hodsen and Anderson directly conflicts 
with DOPL's constitutional duties. 
Third, unlike the 1993 case relying on the constraints that could be placed on 
the exercise of inalienable rights regarding property, the claims of Hodsen and 
Anderson are grounded on a right to receive, use and share truthful and non-
66
 Furthermore, even if it did, the right of communication and self-determination 
asserted in this case would seemingly mirror the deference given by the court to the 
rights of expression and communication found in the 1983 case. 
67
 Utah Const., Article VII, § 5(1). 
68
 Utah Const., Article I, § 26. 
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misleading information to formulate opinions, religious beliefs, and make choices 
based on the same. 
Thus, upon closer examination, the modem precedents indicating that in some 
situations Utah appellate courts have restricted the exercise of expressly articulated 
rights under the Utah Constitution are distinguishable as a matter of fact and law 
from the unjustified total ban on specific speech between Hodsen and Anderson. 
4. Previous Decisions Upholding Constitutional Challenges 
to Criminal or Contempt Charges Under UMPA 
Are Distinguishable 
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed several challenges to UMPA in 
criminal or civil contempt cases. While the result of early precedent has been 
altered by legislative decision,69 the Court has upheld the authority of the state to 
prevent conduct by certain persons who were engaging in the practice of medicine. 
Nonetheless, the three leading cases are legally and factually distinguishable from 
the case presented by Hodsen and Anderson. 
69
 The upholding of the right to prohibit the sale of herbs and related matters in 
State v. Yee Foo Lun. 45 Utah 531,147 P. 488 (1915) was superseded in 1969 by 
the inclusion of an exemption allowing those involved in the sale of herbs and other 
products of nature to practice medicine as it was then defined. The right of those 
included in the various exemptions to practice medicine without a license was 
previously recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. See Gibb v. Dorius. 533 P.2d 
299, 300 (Utah 1975). 
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a. Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair 
In 1921 the Utah Supreme Court upheld the right of the State of Utah to 
regulate the practice of medicine and exclude the practice of chiropractic in the State 
of Utah.70 Nonetheless, in the opinion the Utah Supreme Court stated therein there 
were several types of situations that would justify a constitutional challenge to the 
actions of the legislature. Constitutional challenges were appropriate when the laws 
were "clearly unreasonable, discriminatory, or deprive[d] a citizen of some right or 
privilege guaranteed by the Constitution," "violate[d] some fundamental right of the 
individual," or "clearly prohibited by some provision of the Constitution, or 
unreasonable and discriminatory."71 
The case of Hodsen and Anderson is distinguishable from this 1921 precedent 
for three reasons. First, the constitutional issues raised by in this case were not 
raised in Blair. Second, the conflicts between the exercise of fundamental rights of 
Hodsen and Anderson and the restrictions of the UMPA satisfy the legal standards 
announced by Blair as being sufficient to challenge the constitutionality of legislation. 
Third, since 1921 constitutional jurisprudence has evolved and expanded on both a 
state and federal level, affording much broader protections for the individual 
70
 Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair. 57 Ut. 516.196 P. 221(1921). 
71
 Jd. at 224. 
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exercise of rights of speech, religion, and personal autonomy than were applicable 
when Blair was decided. 
b. Utah v. Hoffman I 
In 1976, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction for practicing 
medicine without a license.72 A plethora of constitutional arguments not raised in this 
case were summarily recited and apparently dismissed without significant, if any, 
comment by the Utah Supreme Court.73 Not only is the factual backdrop of the 
claims of Hodsen and Anderson markedly different than those raised in Hoffman I. 
the assumed evils of unlicensed practice are not present in this case. Furthermore, 
without question, there has been an appropriate raising of religious claims in this 
case. 
Preventing presumed evils of unlicensed medical practice was recognized as 
being the prerogative of the Legislature. Criminal defendant Hoffman had been 
involved in touching patients, applying supposed instruments to them, and using 
products that were not lawfully marketed. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
72
 State v. Hoffman. (Hoffman I). 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976). 
73
 "In State v. Lorrah the defendant argued that he was denied a 'due process 
right of allocution.' However, we rejected his contention without analysis. This 
passing reference was not intended to give allocution right constitutional 
recognition." State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 357 (Utah 1993). 
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It seems self-evident that the protection of the people of the State of 
Utah against unlearned, unqualified and unproven persons who desire 
to tamper with human life, health and physical and mental well-being 
should be the duty of the Legislature. 
Utah requires certain qualifications of persons practicing 
medicine and it is obvious they lessen the evil of unqualified practice, 
such as that present in this case, where the healing form is so 
ridiculous that it stretches the imagination that the Legislature could 
even consider it as a healing form.74 
The exchange of truthful and non-misleading information for personal, 
religious, and commercial reasons regarding products lawfully sold on the open 
market (which for years had been allowed under a comprehensive exemption) is 
entirely distinguishable from the conduct criticized in Hoffman I. The giving and 
sharing of truthful information regarding lawful products of nature is an exercise of 
fundamental rights that the Utah and United States Constitutions require the 
Legislature to respect and allow. 
Criminal defendant Hoffman also claimed that UMPA was unconstitutional 
because it "denie[d] [the provider]... [the] right of conscience or abridges his free 
exercise of religion." The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim by affirming that 
[t]he Legislature is protecting the people from the quacks who would 
deceive them into thinking they are receiving medical relief, when, in 
reality, they are being deprived of their money without the remotest 
possibility of cure. This type of quackery also prevents people who 
may be or are in the dire need of competent aid by their either delaying 
or foregoing proper treatment. These ill people think they are being 
74
 Hoffman I. at 605 (citation omitted). 
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cured, when, in fact, they are receiving no real help. There is no 
evidence the appellant is a member of any valid religious organization 
or that he has valid religious beliefs to do what he did. In any event, 
such belief wouldn't justify the conduct he advocates.75 
For at least six reasons, the position of Hodsen and Anderson is markedly 
different than that described above. 
First, any reference to religious belief not justifying alternate medical 
perspectives and action is mere dicta as the Court already determined that Hoffman 
did not have standing to raise the claim. 
Second, unlike the explicit references in this case, there was no evidence in 
Hoffman I of any sincerely held or practiced religious belief. (Compare R. at 274 and 
330.) 
Third, as to the information Anderson and Hodsen desired to share, 
[t]here are numerous scientific publications and other studies that 
indicate the use of herbs or products of nature, religiously based belief 
or prayer, and other aspects of holistic healing have a positive impact 
upon the maintenance of one's health. 
(R. at 284) No such claim could be made for the conduct engaged in by the 
defendant in Hoffman I. 
Fourth, unlike the Court's perceptions of the speech in Hoffman I. since 1983, 
Hodsen has been lawfully communicating his insights from years of study, 
Hoffman I. 558 P.2d at 605-606. 
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biochemistry training, receipt of an M.D. degree, religious and prayer; it was only 
a legislative change in 1996 that made his communication unlawful. 
Fifth, Hodsen's communications with Anderson have been very helpful to her 
in the past (R. at 330-1); the lack of communication has damaged her physical, 
emotional, and religious well-being now. (R. at 331) 
Sixth, Anderson does not operate in a vacuum of information and products; 
she desires the additional information for her own consideration, formulation of 
religious belief, and as an adjunct to the care that she receives from a licensed 
physician and acupuncturist. (R. at 329-30) All of these factors distinguish the 
present case from Hoffman I. 
c. Utah v. Hoffman II 
In 1987, in Hoffman H.76 the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed another criminal 
conviction for violating the UMPA against the same criminal defendant that had 
before the Court in Hoffman I. Again, the relevant claims rejected in Hoffman II are 
distinguishable both factually and legally from the present case. 
(i) Hodsen and Anderson Have Raised and Briefed 
Fundamental Constitutional Violations 
In Hoffman II. it was claimed that UMPA violated the First and Fourteenth 
amendments of the United States Constitution. In response to the same, the per 
76
 State v. Hoffman. (Hoffman II). 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987). 
47 
curiam opinion noted that the "defendant cite[d] no authority in support of this 
contention. We find no merit to the contention."77 Part of this rejection could be 
attributed to the failure of the criminal defendant to properly brief arguments. 
Hodsen and Anderson, on the other hand, have cited in the trial court and on 
appeal extensive authority regarding the nature and extent of their fundamental 
rights, as it relates to the exchange of truthful and non-misleading personal, 
religious, and commercial speech, formulation and exercise of religious beliefs, and 
personal autonomy. Having done so, Hodsen and Anderson have established a 
prima facie case of infringement; the burden is now on DOPL to shoulder its 
constitutional burden and show that "faithful execution" of the law requires vilation 
of the Utah Constitution's Declaration of Rights. 
This conclusion is not modified by the generalized observation in Hoffman II 
that the "Defendant has not shown and cannot show that a criminal violation of the 
Act by the unlicensed prescription of treatments and cures to the gullible and unwary 
public for compensation rises to the level of constitutionally protected activity."78 
This statement is not binding on this court's consideration of the claims of Hodsen 
and Anderson's for at least five reasons. 
jd. At 504-5. 
id, at 505. 
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First, as the information sought and desired by Plaintiffs in this case is truthful 
and not misleading, Anderson has been previously significantly benefitted by the 
same, and Hodsen has significant training and experience, (M.D. degree, 
undergraduate biochemistry degree, years of work with products and analysis), the 
factual issues in this case are significantly different from that of Hoffman II. 
Second, none of what Hodsen sells and provides information for is a 
"prescription" as that term is defined by law; rather, they are herbs and other 
products of nature, all lawful products on the open market. 
Third, after Hoffman II was decided, the 1996 Legislature removed the term 
"advise" from their definition of the practice of medicine. 
Fourth, the Utah Supreme Court's reliance in Hoffman II on State v. Hoffman 
L and Board v. Blair as justification for their conclusion; as noted above, both of 
these cases are distinguishable from the situation of Hodsen and Anderson. 
Fifth, the Colorado Supreme Court precedent cited without comment 79in 
Hoffman II is also distinguishable from the present case. In dicta, the Colorado 
Supreme Court observed it was applying a criminal law in a setting that "has no 
discemable effect on speech or expression" and an inability to "discern any specific 
People v. Jeffers. 690 P.2d 194 (Colo. 1984). 
49 
overbroad applications, substantial or otherwise, that this statute may have."80 The 
stipulated facts in this case clearly demonstrate a direct effect on speech, 
expression, and overbroad application as it has been applied to Hodsen and 
Anderson. Thus, the dicta of the Colorado Court is not applicable to this case. 
All of the foregoing suggests that the previous rulings of the Utah Supreme 
Court upholding the application of UMPA are distinguishable from the case of 
Hodsen and Anderson. 
(ii) As Applied to Hodsen and Anderson, 
UMPA Is Overbroad 
In Hoffman II. the criminal defendant also claimed that the UMPA was 
overbroad.81 An overbroad law is one shown "to prohibit constitutionally protected 
behavior as well as unprotected behavior."82 Although the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the overbreadth claim in Hoffman II: its rejection is distinguishable from the 
case of Hodsen and Anderson for at least two reasons. 
First, the Court found the criminal defendant did not have standing to make the 
claim for others.83 As the case before this court is an action for injunctive and 
80
 id. at 198 (citations omitted.) 
81
 Hoffman II supra, 733 P.2d at 505. 
82Jo\ 
83
 id- at 505-6. 
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declaratory relief, a party may make claims for third-parties;84 in all events, Anderson 
can surely speak for herself on overbreadth issues. 
Second, the Hodsen and Anderson have alleged that numerous constitutional 
protections available under the Utah and federal constitution have been violated. 
The Utah Court relied on three United States Supreme Court cases decided from 
1889-1926 to uphold the claim that "[t]he right to practice medicine, to diagnose 
maladies, and to prescribe for their treatment is not constitutionally superior to the 
state's powerto impose comprehensive and rigid regulations on the practice."85 This 
authority is distinguished by the precedent cited by Hodsen and Anderson that 
recognizes their fundamental right to exchange truthful and non-misleading 
information, precedent that has all been adopted after the decision of Hoffman II. 
By reason of all of the foregoing, it is apparent that previous rejection by the 
Utah Supreme Court of challenges to the constitutionality of UMPA are 
distinguishable both factually and legally from the claims of Hodsen and Anderson. 
This means that previous Utah precedent provides an insufficient foundation for 
DOPL to claim in this case that they have compelling governmental interest in 
prohibiting the exchange of truthful and non-misleading information between Hodsen 
84
 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,193-195,97 S.Ct. 451,454-456,50 L.Ed.2d 
397(1976). 
85
 Hoffman II. supra, jd- at 503 n. 4. 
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and Anderson regarding herbs and other products of nature that are openly and 
lawfully sold. 
B. DOPL Has Failed to Use The Least Restrictive Means 
In Prohibiting Truthful and Non-Misleading Speech of 
Hodsen and Anderson 
UMPA's overbroad definition of "diagnosis" which prohibits the exchange by 
Hodsen and Anderson of truthful and non-misleading information regarding lawful 
herbs and other products of nature, and DOPL's prohibition on Hodsen's use of the 
designation "M.D.", is not the least restrictive means to address any compelling 
concerns the Legislature may have. This can be shown in at least three ways. 
First, the Utah Legislature has already broadly allowed without licensure for 
the evaluation of a person's dietary status, dietary needs, implementation of a 
support system to meet those needs, and giving advice and education regarding the 
same. By adopting a 1986 Dietitian Certification Act rather than Dietitian Licensure 
Act, the Legislature allowed those who do not hold themselves as a certified 
dietician, to 
integrate] and appl[y] principles derived from the sciences of food for 
the development, management and provision of dietary services for 
individuals and groups for meeting their health care needs. . . 
[including] the evaluation of a person's dietary status,. . .the advising 
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and education of persons on dietary needs,.. .the evaluation of needs, 
implementation of support systems to support needs... ,86 
As it relates to the use of herbs and other products of nature, rather than ban 
the exchange of information relative to giving advice about their use, the Legislature 
could similarly have allowed for the evaluation of persons, determination of needs, 
and appropriate education regarding the same so long as the person providing the 
information provided truthful and non-misleading information (as Hodsen and 
Anderson seek here) and did not hold him or herself out as either a certified dietician 
or a licensed physician or surgeon. 
Second, as it relates to the total ban on Hodsen's use of the phrase M.D., 
Hodsen himself has already suggested a less restrictive alternative to ensure that 
no one is injured by his use of the designation. He has offered to place a 
clarification on each business card or published article that states "Graduate of 
UCLA School of Medicine" and "Research Biochemist not in Medical Practice". 
DOPL has not offered any evidence that indicates either of these statements are not 
true or that there is a real rather than imagined fear that individuals working with him 
will believe that he is licensed by the State of Utah. (R. at 281) In addition, the 
additional requirement that "the designation must additionally contain the description 
See Dietician Certification Act, § 58-49-2(4) U.C.A. 
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of the branch of the healing arts for which the person has a license,"87 allows no 
option for a person who is not licensed. A less restrictive requirement would be to 
list, if applicable, any license that is held, or an explicit disclaimer of licensure. 
All of the foregoing shows that the 1996 UMPA's justifications recited in the 
trial court below, if found to be compelling, with regard to the total prohibition on 
Hodsen and Anderson's exchange of truthful and non-misleading information 
regarding herbs and other products of nature, and Hodsen's use of the designation 
"M.D.," could have been achieved by other less intrusive or less restrictive means. 
CONCLUSION 
The "Constitution of Utah . . . gives its citizens the 'inherent and inalienable' 
right to petition a state tribunal for redress of grievances in civil actions."88 Hodsen 
and Anderson have exercised this right by seeking judicial relief at a trial and now 
appellate level to protect their exercise of fundamental rights of speech as well as 
the formulation and exercise of religious beliefs from the total ban on truthful and 
non-misleading speech imposed by UMPA and DOPL. 
DOPL has offered no actual evidence demonstrating the existence of an 
interest of the highest order requiring such draconian measures or, if there is a 
U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8)(d). 
Kish v. Wright. 562 P.2d 625, 627 (Utah 1977) (footnote omitted). 
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compelling governmental interest, that UMPA has used the least restrictive means 
in the case of Hodsen and Anderson to achieve the overriding objective. DOPL's 
constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed does not allow Utah's 
Executive or Legislative branches of government to ignore the mandatory 
constitutional provisions that protect the exchange of truthful and non-misleading 
information as part of one's speech as well as formulation and exercise of religious 
belief. 
The decision of the court below should be reversed and this matter remanded 
for entry of judgment in favor of Hodsen and Anderson. 
DATED this 5th day of April, 1999. 
Matthew Hilton of Matthew Hilton.P.C. 
Attorney for Hodsen and Anderson 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants, dated June 30, 
1998 and docketed June 30, 1998. 
2. Certificate of Mailing and Faxing of Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion and 
Memorandum dated July 10,1998. 
3. Order executed by Judge James L. Shumate dated July 29, 1998 and 
docketed on July 30,1998. 
4. Notice of Appeal filed and docketed with the trial court on August 27,1998. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HORTON HODSEN, as agent for 
Nutriphysiology, (previously known as 
Nutribionics and Biochem Research 
Services), and for himself personally, as 
Horton E. Tatarian: and GAIL 
ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a municipality * 
under Utah Law; and CRAIG JACKSON, * 
Director of the Division of Occupational and * 
Professional Licensing, Department of * 
Commerce, State of Utah in his official * 
capacity, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 960500182 
Judge Jamc3 L. Shumate 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Wednesday, May 13, 1998, at the hour of 2:30 p.m.. Plaintiffs appearing in person through 
Horton Hodsen, and through counsel. Matt Hilton, Defendants appearing through counsel. Thorn 
D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings on file 
herein, including the Memorandums in support of both parties motions, and the affidavit of Gail 
Anderson, and the agreed statement of facts, having been received the arguments of counsel, 
including the presumption of constitutionalitv of state statutes, and good cause appearing, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgement shall be and the same is hereby denied; it is farther 
ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
the Defendants shall be and the same is hereby granted; it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that based upon the prior stipulation 
between the Plaintiffs and Defendant City of St. George, that this Order grants final relief and 
resolves all issues pending in the litigation; it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECRbbD that each party shall bear their own costs 
and attorney fees incurred herein. 
DATED this _JQ_ day of June. 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
H O N J Q I * ^ 
Approved a5 to furm. District Court Judge 
MATTHEW HILTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
/ " > . 
1f J u J 
J NT v 
Matthew Hilton (#A3655) " " " 
MATTHEW HILTON, PC. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P.O. Box 781 
Springville, UT 84663 
Telephone: (801)489-1111 
Facsimile: (801) 489-6000 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
HORTON HODSEN, as agent for Nutriphysio-) 
logy, (previously known as Nutribionics and CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Biochem Research Services), and for himself ) AND FAXING 
personally, as Horton E. Tatarian, and GAIL 
ANDERSON, ) 
Plaintiffs. 
) 
vs. 
) Civil No. 96-500182 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a municipality under 
Utah Law, and CRAIG JACKSON, Director ) 
of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, Department of ) 
Commerce, State of Utah, in his official 
capacity, ) Judge James L. Shumate 
Defendants. ) 
—oooOooo— 
Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel of record, respectfully certify 
that he has sent by facsimile and first class registered mail a copy of Plaintiffs' Rule 59 
motion, memorandum, and certificate of faxing and mailing to the following: 
1 
Thorn D. Roberts 
Blaine R. Ferguson 
Assistant Attorneys General 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 149857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
Facsimile: (801) - 366- 0315 
DATED this 10th day of July, 1998. 
MATTHEW HILTON, PC. 
Matthew Hilton 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
TO: 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT : . ; : R 7 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE,.OF UTAH 
JUDGE JAMES L SHUMATE " " ^ ' 
JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM 
JUDGE J. PHILIP EVES 
t t r 
Re: Case* M O S C C l R 
Plaintiff:"' "M^Q'.CC n" 
vs 
Defendant: 
; 
A Notice to Submit for Decision/ Request for Ruling was filed on the ^ day of 
19 ..by attorney for plaintiff 
attorney for defendant 
other 
The following motions are submitted for decision: 
PLA's DEF's Motion for Summary Judgment 
PLA's DEF's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
PLA's DEF's Motion to Dismiss Continue 
PLA's DEF's Objection to 
*S RULING: 
/^W/-/Pf J i<*y *j?$t* l^ fitf-err-ft/-Ltd 
6j^-^{A^ ^lew/f p/
 t 
Dated this 2 4 - <*y of <jji • I9££ 
I hereby certify that on the 31 day of July^ 
the foregoing Court's Ruling to the following: 
Thom Roberts 
Blaine Ferguson 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt LAKE City, Utah 84114 
Mr. Horton Hodsen 
P.O. Box 1900 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Gail Anderson 
5830 W. Cascade 
Mountain Green, uta 84050 
Distri£l^ &5urt Judge 
,19 98 , I mailed a copy of 
Matthew Hilton 
P.O. Box 781 
^pingvine, Utah «4b63 
fir!ry Knhlmann, 
175 E. 200 N. 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Matthew Hilton (#3655) 
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C. 
Participating Attorney for the Rutherford Institute 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1220 North Main Street # 5A 
P.O. Box 781 
Springville, UT 84663 
Telephone: (801)489-1111 
Facsimile: (801)489-6000 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
HORTON HODSEN, as agent for Nutriphysio 
logy, (previously known as Nutribionics and 
Biochem Research Services), and for himself 
personally, as Horton E. Tatarian, and GAIL 
ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs. 
vs. 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a municipality under 
Utah Law, and CRAIG JACKSON, Director 
of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, Department of 
Commerce, State of Utah, in his official 
capacity, 
Defendants. 
—oooOooo— 
Notice is hereby given that the Plaintiffs and Appellants, Horton Hodsen, as agent 
for Nutriphysiology, (previously known as Nutribionics and Biochem Research Services, 
and for himself, personally, as Horton E. Tatarian, and Gail Anderson, through Matthew 
Hilton of Matthew Hilton, P.C, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the final judgment 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 960500182 
Judge James L. Shumate 
of the Honorable James L. Shumate dated June 30, 1998 and the denial of Plaintiffs' 
motion brought under Rule 59 U.R.Civ. P. dated July 29, 1998 and docketed July 30, 1998. 
DATED this 26th day of August, 1998. 
MATTHEW HILTON, PC. 
latthew Hilton 
2 
